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I. BLUES
[T]he blues [is defined by a standard dictionary] as a "song of
American Negro origin, that is marked by the frequent
occurrence of blue notes and that takes the basic form... of
a 12-bar chorus consisting of a 3-line stanza, with the second
line repeating the first." ...

[However,] I might prefer to

define them as musical melanin, pentatonic cargo imported to
America from West Africa, with shiploads of slaves.'
Woody Allen2 has always been my favorite film maker. I identify with
his angst and his humor-and, if I have to admit it, with his fight to make

* Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law; Visiting Professor of Law, University
of Miami; and Charles Hamilton Houston Visiting Professor of Law, North Carolina Central
University School of Law, 1998-99.
1. FRANCiS DAVIS, THE HISTORY OF THE BLUES 4 (1995) (alteration in original) (citation

omitted).
2. I started writing this Essay long before the publicized dispute between Mr. Allen and Mia
Farrow, his long time companion and mother of his only natural-born child. Nothing in this paper

is meant to implicate the concerns and allegations in MIAFARROW, WHATFAULS AWAY: AMEMOIR
(1997). 1 am talking, instead, about the public use of race in Mr. Allen's movies. It is worth noting
that I have neither met Mr. Allen nor discussed these issues with him.
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homeliness chic. However, at least in the 70s and 80s, Allen failed to
include any black people as serious characters in his movies, which took
me aback.
In the world described by Woody Allen's movies, there are no
"real" 3 black people.
I can understand not including "real" black people in scenes of intimate
family get-togethers, but when a movie called Manhattan4 has no black
people, one is mystified.5 I know from his public history and his humor
that Woody Allen is concerned about racial issues and is opposed to
racism. He has spoken out consistently against the kind of racial politics
that dominates public life at the end of the twentieth century, and though
I have never met him, I believe that he genuinely would like to see the
demise of race and racism in our body politic.
How do you explain the absence of real black people in a large corpus
of his cinematic work? The answer that I have come to is a liberal response
that reflects my own and slightly older generations. When problems are too
difficult, we ignore them and hope they will go away. I think Allen
excludes black people from his movies because he is afraid that including
them would create the stereotypic characterizations that were the only
representations of black people when he became a film maker and are still
prevalent today.6 I interpret this response of exclusion and denial, what I
call the "Woody Allen Blues," to be an outgrowth of the liberal
establishment's inability to deal with race and identity. I think Allen would
say, "IfIleave black characters out of my movies I will not be part of the
racist structure created by movies and television programs from Birth of a
Nation7 to Amos andAndy."
I want to make the argument that we hear this kind of response about
race, class, and identity all the time in our legal culture. "If black people
were not so caught up in their racial identity, racism would go away.".8 "I
3. By "real," I mean a serious character within the main plot of a movie. Allen has included
a few black people in the background of his movies, and has occasionally talked about race
relations, but he has failed to include black people as main characters in his films. Allen has never
explored black characters in the ways that he has explored Jewish and Italian characters. See, e.g.,
BROADWAY DANNY ROSE (Orion 1984) (featuring Allen as a Jewish theatrical agent and Mia
Farrow as a Mafia widow). Woody Allen may think that black characters could hurt the monetary
value of his movies or he may have a myriad of other reasons for not featuring them.
4. MANH7TrAN (Orion 1979). Cf DECONSTRUcING HARRY (New Line 1997) (featuring
a black prostitute, with little depth, as a chief character) (discussed infra Part VI).
5. I do not mean to take a position on the controversy generated by August Wilson calling
for a black theater and questioning the use ofblack actors in "nonblack" roles. This controversy was
joined by Henry Louis Gates in the pages of the New Yorker. As far as I can tell, Allen does not
use white actors to create "black" roles, or black actors to create "white" roles.
6. One only has to watch an episode of the television show Martin to see that these
stereotypes still exist and that they are not limited to mainly white casts.
7. BiRTH OFA NATION (Epoch Production Corp. 1915).
8. The most recent example of this response by a law professor is the article written by
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don't want to know a person's sexual orientation; if they simply kept it to
themselves, I wouldn't have to deal with it.".9 "Feminists always see the
woman's question in legal problems, but that means they are not cognizant
of the larger human question." These are all efforts to silence the question
of identity in legal and other social situations. These efforts can be
characterized simply as an attack on "identity politics." This Essay is
intended to show the inherent nonsense of dismissing "identity politics" as
unimportant to understanding the law and doing justice. Such dismissal is
a form of the "Woody Allen Blues." I am not making the claim that this
effort to dismiss the importance of identity by calling it "identity politics,"
at least in the nonracist academic circles, is part of some simple notion of
racism or homophobia or anti-poor animus. I want to deal with the
renewed effort inside the legal academy and in courtrooms to suppress
identity and to pose a series of questions about the efficacy and justice
associated with doing so. I will end by describing how, in the one area
where "identity politics" is not very important, we have the least possibility
of creating legal and social change (and that area is class differences).
The legal six-line chorus that gets repeated by the 'Woody Allen
Blues" is that if we do not speak of race, then racism does not exist. This
line of legal music is repeated as we eliminate racism from legal and social
settings by eliminating race. The discordant notes you shall read next are
my view that this siren song of American culture is wrong-headed.
I would like to add that not all of the individuals who will be discussed
here fall into the most egregious forms of the 'Woody Allen Blues." To be
sure, many have thought and written about the issue of the Constitution in
powerful and important ways."° However, I want to raise the question
among those who share my concern with the racial politics of the
country-a belief in a notion of community, citizen and law-that may
unintentionally leave out the real lives of the people involved. The problem
is that despite our best efforts, there are no black people inside our
definitions of citizenship. I believe that the category of whether

Jeffrey Rosen in the New Republic attributing the Simpson verdict to Critical Race Theorists. See
Jeffrey Rosen, The Bloods and the Crits: O.J. Simpson, Criminal Race Theory, the Law, and the
Triumph of Color in America, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 9, 1996, at 27. We took the genie of race out

of the bottle. This view is simply another effort to kill the messenger.
9. See, e.g., Kenneth L. Karst, Myths of Identity: Individual and Group Portraits of Race
and Sexual Orientation, 43 UCLA L. REv. 263, 358 (1995) ('qhe other side of this coin is that
many Americans who self-identify as heterosexual do not seem troubled by working with people
whom they identify as gay so long as the subject of sexual orientation never comes into sharp focus.
By act of Congress, staying in the closet is now an explicit condition of employment for gay and
lesbian members of the armed forces: We won't ask, but if you tell, you're gone.")

10. Ithink here particularly of Kenneth Karst who has made important contributions to trying
to eliminate discrimination over a long history. See generally KENNETH L. KARST,BELONGING TO
AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE CONSTITUTION (1989).
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citizen-meant to be or not-is defined in terms of the white male
dominated majority. When we speak of an American identity
definitionally, we cannot describe in law and social policy such an identity
in a way that includes the "other." I am going to talk most directly about
this concern with respect to race, but it applies to gender and sexual
orientation as well.
Some critics of identity have argued that the identity concerns of race,
gender, and sexual orientation are arbitrary and that we miss important
other identities that construct and control people's lives. Where is the
investigation of the so called "trailer trash" who live in double-wides and
who are limited by perceptions of their moral and economic insufficiency?
By definition, there is an infimite number of ways to organize our
interrogation of society. Those of us worried about connecting our politics
to identity issues do not claim that these are the only concerns. Some of us
are also Republicans, Democrats, Independents, conservatives, liberals,
and radicals. A few of us may even live in double-wides as blacks, gays,
lesbians, bisexuals, or poor people. The claimed need to engage in some
form of identity politics is not a claim of exclusivity. All of us have
multiple identities and belong to multiple communities. The reason that we
are concerned with issues of race, gender, and sexual orientation is that at
this point in American society, these identity concerns are central to much
of the oppression that needs to be changed.
II. "IDENTiTY POLITICS" AND RACE AT THE END
OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Individuals who have been wronged by unlawful racial
discrimination should be made whole; but under our
Constitution there can be no such thing as either a creditor or
a debtor race. . . . To pursue the concept of racial
entitlement-even for the most admirable and benign of
purposes-is to reinforce and preserve for future mischief the
way of thinking that produced race slavery, race privilege and
race hatred. In the eyes of government, we are just one race
here. It is American.
[E]qual citizenship as a principle of law-a substantive
principle, not one of disembodied formality-looks toward
allowing all persons, including nonconformists, the freedom
to define themselves .... Under this principle's regime,...
government must protect both self-identification and the

11. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(emphasis added).
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refusal to self-identify, both expression and non-expression,
over the widest range of identities or non-identities. In sum,
. . . ethnic politics often treats individuals as cardboard
cutouts, equal citizenship allows people to be their own
selves, whole and complex, to name their own realities; where
ethnic-style politics tends to value group loyalty over
diversity, equal citizenship
offers opportunities to be
12
differently different.
Liberal theorists have a difficult time dealing with the issue of identity.
Traditional legal and political theory thinks of identity in two ways. One
way is to see identity as a product of a particular community or ethnic
conglomeration. The other way is to see identity as a product of individual
choice. For traditional liberal theorists, the individual is only totally free
if she is completely autonomous. Freedom stems from the ability to pick
and choose and to create an individual life free of commitments to either
a particular community or identity.13 Inside this standard liberal theory, the
only place for identity connected to an ethnic, racial, or sexual orientation
community is as a form of imposing power on others. In this view, for
liberal theory to speak about the importance of identity and to claim an
identity that is different from some common identity is to fall subject to
ethnic, gender, racial or sexual orientation imperialism. The
community-connected identity sees its creation as a product of the
collective, while individual identity sees itself as a product of individual
choice. The problem is, of course, that real identity does not fit neatly into
either category. Individual identity cannot explain how or why individuals
might choose to be part of a community for some, but not all, purposes.
Why do people have a sense of identity that does not necessarily develop
from traditional communities, but rather from race, gender, or sexual
orientation? Unmodified community identity cannot explain where
individual choices come from. If people have to choose from social
artifacts of ethnic or racial communities in order to create free choices,
where do those choices come from? If there is no black community, how
does jazz or blues exist? Many cultural artifacts draw strength from their
connection to community; when that connection is lost, the artifact may
exist, but it may lose or even gain something. 4 Many of the choices made
by the cosmopolitan individual come from ethnic communities. Therefore,

12. Karst, supra note 9, at 366.
13. See generallyJeremy Waldron, Minority Culturesandthe CosmopolitanAlternative, 25
U. MICH. J.L. RE. 751 (1992).
14. Let me be quite clear here. I do not mean to suggest that, for example, only black people
can sing the blues or play jazz. I do mean to say that when those who do join in do so out of the
context of the communities that developed those artistic expressions, the art changes. This may be
for the better or the worse, but the art changes and that change is never either superior or inferior.
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neither approach can explain how to create and sustain identity.
This confusion, in theory, shows up in constitutional practice. To think
of the issue of identity in constitutional terms is to be lost in issues of the
race, gender, and sexual orientation of people who claim constitutional
protection. Drawing on the language found in footnote four of United
States v. Carolene Products,5 which interpreted the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 6 courts have provided some
meaningful protections for people who are African-American, MexicanAmerican, Asian, gay, lesbian or female. 7 As Kenneth Karst has pointed
out, the requirement that people demonstrate that they are a suspect class
in order to get constitutional protection under strict scrutiny has a number
of disturbing connotations. As the Court's recent jurisprudence suggests,
the notion that a government classification is suspect can be turned around
8
into a question of whether the class at issue warrants suspect status.1
The problem for African-Americans in the constitutional jurisprudential
ferment is that often when they want to claim a racial identity, the law
ignores them. For example when police officers use race to stop a suspect
on the highway,' 9 border guards inspect a person at the border because of
race, 20 or an African American or Latino seeks admission to a jury, courts
have consistently concluded that the racial identity of the person stopped,
frisked, inspected, and excluded, does not apply outside of a prohibition on
the actor from stating that they are doing so because of the person's race.
15. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
16. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I (providing that "[n]o State shall... deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws").
17. See Karst, supra note 9, at 325.
18. See id. at 325-26.
19. See, e.g., Joseph Neff & Pat Stith, Highway Drug Unit Focuses on Blacks, THE NEWS
AND OBsERVER, July 28, 1996, at Al.
A select North Carolina Highway Patrol team, assigned to intercept illegal drugs
on Interstates 95 and 85, charged black male drivers at nearly twice the rate of
other troopers working the same roads.... In 1995, the Special Emphasis Team
searched 3,501 vehicles and found drugs in 210-about one in every 17 vehicles
searched. Cardwell [head of the western North Carolina's special team] says he's
satisfied with the 1-in-17 payoff. "You may have had 17 cars searched where
drugs are only found one time," he said. "But that's not to say that that person
who didn't have it wasn't involved."
Id.
20. For example, the border check on Interstate 5 between San Diego and Los Angeles is, as
far as I can tell, simply a racial test of whether you look Mexican or not. Cf Robert S. Chang, A
Meditation on Borders, in THE NEW NATIVISM (Juan Perea ed. 1996) (discussing the Interstate 5
border check). As Professor Chang points out, the border is not limited to the Rio Grande but
applies to any international port of entry and includes all international airports, as well as the
surrounding countryside-or city or suburban area-within 200 miles of those facilities.
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The last comment is a slight exaggeration. Some courts have been willing
to say that if there is no other explanation for a sustained pattern of raceconnected decisions, they will find that this amounts to racial or gender
discrimination. 2 But the courts' rulings in racial discrimination challenges
to juries and police treatment of suspects do not provide real protection for
the rights of African-Americans and other people of color so as to ensure
their right to participate in the legal process. The individual excluded,
frisked, searched and arrested is being treated like any other person
traveling on a highway in a Lexus, crossing the many borders of the United
States, or serving in a jury pool. There is an American identity that we are
all entitled to, but it applies differently to blacks or Latinos in those
circumstances. The courts have been known to ignore the racial identity of
white people who challenge the right to create African-American
communities.' Evidently, racial communities are the only communities
that need not be respected.' African-Americans are required to adopt a
racial identity in the cases involving redistricting even when they claim
they are not black-just communities. Evidently, for a majority on the
current Supreme Court, black people are also the only ones who cannot
seek political power through their vote. In a state like North Carolina,
where black voters are reliable Democratic voters ninety-five percent of the
time, it is the Court that is treating the community that makes up North
Carolina's Twelfth Congressional District as a "black" one, and not a
21. My favorite case in this area is United States v. Uwaezhoke, 995 F.2d 388, 393 (3rd Cir.
1993).
The prosecutors, at the time they exercised the peremptory challenge, knew that
Ms. Lucas was a single parent of two children who was making the salary of a
postal worker with four years of seniority and renting an apartment in Newark,
New Jersey. It is, we believe, fair to infer that the prosecutors, in the absence of
any more detailed information concerning Ms. Lucas, speculated that she might
live in low income housing in Newark. Having so speculated, the prosecutors
inferred that Ms. Lucas was more likely to have had direct exposure to drug
trafficking than someone who did not live in low-income housing in Newark.
While this conclusion may or may not be empirically correct, we cannot say that
it exhibits racially discriminatory intent as a matter of law.
Id.
22. The five plaintiffs in Shaw v. Reno did not claim to be white. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S.
630, 641 (1993) ("An understanding of the nature of appellants' claim is critical to our resolution
of the case. In their complaint, appellants did not claim that the General Assembly's
reapportionment plan unconstitutionally 'diluted' white voting strength. They did not even claim
to be white. Rather, appellants' complaint alleged that the deliberate segregation of voters into
separate districts on the basis of race violated their constitutional right to participate in a
'colorblind' electoral process.").
23. CompareShaw, 509 U.S. at 630, with Pope v. Blue, 809 F. Supp. 392 (W.D.N.C.), aft'd,
506 U.S. 801 (1992) (affirming the district court's judgement without opinion).
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political one. While I write this as a member of that community, I do not
deny the "blackness" of that community 4 in asserting my belief that the
community is political. The court cannot understand that a community
might have both a political and a racial identity. Identity is exclusionary
and singular. There are reasons buried in the history of the politics of North
Carolina why black people vote ninety-five percent Democratic.25 The
problem is that white people never have an identity no matter how much
it oppresses black people. 6 Similarly, there are historical reasons why a
majority of the Supreme Court can only see North Carolina's Twelfth
Congressional District, located along the major road of the state and the
most urban district in the state, as predominately about race and not about
the racism that helped to distribute black people in this pattern to begin
with. Chief Justice Rehnquist said for a majority of the Court that:
We do not quarrel with the dissent's claims that, in shaping
District 12, the State effectuated its interest in creating one
rural and one urban district, and that partisan politicking was
actively at work in the districting process. That the legislature
addressed these interests does not in any way refute the fact
that race was the legislature's predominant consideration.
Race was the criterionthat, in the State's view, could not be
compromised; respecting communities of interest and
protectingDemocraticincumbents came into play only after
the race-baseddecisionhad been made.27
The question that one could pose to Chief Justice Rehnquist is how
could a state that cares about its black community not have race as the
predominant factor under his analysis? The Court has adopted the
interpretation that race was the only factor in the legislature's decisions in
a manner that is inconsistent with how the Court treats pretext and race in
other contexts. For example, in Title VII cases, when the Court asks
whether a person who meets the McDonnellDouglas28 prima facie test has
24. Indeed, it is that blackness that could be the only explanation for why there is a
cognizable harm to the plaintiffs in cases like Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. 408 (1994), rev'd, 517
U.S. 899 (1996).
25. Black people may be unwise in making such choices, but they are the only people not
permitted to do so. As I understand the court's jurisprudence, if a group of largely white tobacco
farmers demanded a district represented by a conservative tobacco-defending Democrat
representative, they are 'Just" a political group and not a racial group.
26. See, e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (declaring Tuskeegee, a
gerrymander, unconstitutional). Gomillion is not a contrary example because Tuskeegee sought to
exclude blacks from being able to participate in the municipal process, and probably excluded them
from the benefits of municipal structures. See id.
27. Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 907 (1996) (emphasis added).
28. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
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been discriminated against, the Court has decided that a pretextual answer
may not be pretextual. As I understand the current majority use of racial
identity, when an employer tells a falsehood in explaining why it fired,
failed to promote, or otherwise discriminated against a person because of
his or her race or gender, the Court will not assume that the reason why the
employer lied was because of discrimination, but will assume that there
may have been another reason.29
One response to this question is to say that the Court might be wrong
about applying strict scrutiny to redistricting cases. If strict scrutiny is
applied, however, it explains the different deference to legislatures. Under
our judicial scrutiny, we do treat the use of race by a state differently than
we do that of an employer. However, in a world where one race votes for
one party ninety-five percent of the time and it is perfectly permissible to
try to protect incumbents, party division, or even to maximize the political
power of a particular party, it seems odd that there is no possibility of
creating a district that otherwise passes constitutional muster because race
is important. The Court's interpretation is that race can be a minor
influence, but when blacks become a majority, those districts become
impermissibly black.
One certain proof that this definition of racial identity is unfair is that,
as Justice Souter suggests, the real reason why these districts exist is that
the Republican party wanted to place the black voters-who are the most
reliable Democratic voters-into districts that would allow more
Republicans to be elected in the other districts. ° One is a little suspicious
of the Bush Administration's Justice Department being so supportive of
the interests of a community that didn't support them politically. It was the
conjunction of a Republican administration Justice Department who allied
themselves with the black communities of North Carolina to produce the
impetus for multiple black districts. The Justice Department's suggestion
would have threatened more incumbent Democratic congressmen because

29. On this point, see Wallace v. SMC Pneumatics,Inc., 103 F.3d 1394, 1399 (1997), in
which Judge Posner wrote:
The true reason for the action of which the plaintiff is complaining might be
something embarrassing to the employer, such as nepotism, personal friendship,
the plaintiffs being a perceived threat to his superior, a mistaken evaluation, the
plaintiff's being a whistleblower, the employer's antipathy to irrelevant but not
statutorily protected personal characteristics, a superior officer's desire to shift
blame to a hapless subordinate-conceivably a factor here-or even an invidious
factor but not one outlawed by the statute under which the plaintiff is suing; or the
true reason might be unknown to the employer, or there might be no reason.

30. See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 1045 (1996).
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it would have made it harder to hold on to the now significantly lessDemocratic districts in the rest of the state.31
How is it that the court can see lots of different reasons for an
employer's action but will ignore the real reason when it is clearly
presented to it? Standards of review will not explain this difference. My
academic colleagues who agree with me that the Court is wrong in this
analysis have suggested that if we simply changed the standard of review,
or if we correctly applied rules of standing in these cases, our current
jurisprudence could be saved.32 Certainly, the Court's currentjurisprudence
in the redistricting cases is frothing with external and internal conflict. I
want to argue, at its heart, that it is possible to produce a fairer and more
consistent system, but the issue that keeps pushing the system toward
inconsistent and unfair rules is its adherence to the "Woody Allen Blues."
I do not argue that this maybe the appropriate litigation strategy. Courts
are non-Kuhnian institutions. Unless pushed by large societal and
jurisprudential forces, inertia limits how fast and far the courts will move.
Sometimes, however, it is important not to become too locked into our
current paradigm to consider ajurisprudential leap to a different and better
discourse. The court did this with respect to Plessy v. Ferguson33 and to
DredScott v. Sandford3 Unfortunately, history teaches us that it was in
the wrong direction. However, the Court may have moved us in the right
direction with its leaps in Brown v. Board of Education35 and Baker v.
Carr. I do not claim that big changes or changes in directions always lead
to better results. Law is a product of people and requires our constant
attention. However, sometimes our notions of how to achieve ajust society
are just plain wrong. I cannot prove that our approach to race is wrong or
going constantly in the wrong direction. Certainly, Leroy Clark is right that
we have made some substantive improvements in the conditions of
African-Americans over the last 136 years, but I am not sure that we can

31. It is no accident that the final result of this process has been in the last two congressional
elections that Republicans made significant inroads on the traditionally Democratic North Carolina
delegation. That delegation is now evenly divided between Democrats and Republicans, including
the two black representatives from the Twelfth and the Second Districts. After the 1994 election
the delegation was even more Republican, becoming majority Republican for the first time since

Reconstruction.
,32. See generally Samuel Issacharoff& Pamela S. Karlan, Standingand Misunderstanding
in Voting Rights Law, 111 HARV. L. REv. 2276 (1998) (arguing that the Court confuses standing
jurisprudence with redistricting jurisprudence). This article is responding to an articleby John Hart
Ely. SeeJohn Hart Ely, Standingto ChallengePro-MinorityGerrymanders,111 HARV.L. REV. 576
(1997) (arguing that the Court has correctly applied standing jurisprudence).
33. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
34. 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
35. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
36. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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be sure of the direction of future change.37 We may be standing at the end
of the Depression or the end of Reconstruction. It is difficult to know
where we are, but it is not unreasonable to question whether we can be sure
of the direction of change in racial or sexual orientation oppression.
I want to argue that at its heart, the jurisprudence of the courts and of
its liberal critics share a common view of identity. Ultimately, both urge
us to get beyond identity to become part of the common. This desire for a
constitutional program to get over identity is part of the problem instead of
being part of the solution. To get beyond race, gender, and sexual
orientation in constitutional discourse is to ultimately fall prey to the
"Woody Allen Blues." The concerns of the racial or sexual minority are
lost inside the definition of the majority. I fear that when that is the tune of
constitutional discourse we will not deal importantly with the concerns of
African-Americans or hear the songs of difference.

III. ESSENTIAUST ANTI-ESSENTIALISM: "IDENTITY

POLITICS"

AND GENDER AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION

Your identity becomes the sole ground of politics, the sole
determinant of political good and evil. Those who disagree
s
with my "politics", then, are the enemies of my identity.
The Colorado amendment does not, to speak entirely
precisely, prohibit giving favored status to people who are
homosexuals; they can be favored for many reasons.... But
it prohibits giving them favored status because of their
homosexual conduct-that is, it prohibits favored status for
homosexuality.39
The call by Arthur Schlesinger Jr., Jean Bethke Elshtaln, and several
Justices of the Supreme Court for an American or universalist identity and
against "identity politics" has aspects of the 'Woody Allen Blues." Those
most opposed to "identity politics" suggest that it is possible to create a
universal identity, or more precisely, an "American" identity, free of the
distortions associated with race, gender, or sexual orientation. In decrying
the use of identity by the weakest groups in the political discourse, these
authors, by definition, defend the right of a majority of the American polity
to define the universal. The universal in these models draws its authenticity
from the right and the power of the majority to define itself. The only

37. See Leroy D. Clark, A Critiqueof ProfessorDerrickA. Bell's Thesis of the Permanence
of Racism and HisStrategy of Confrontation,73 DENy. U. L. REv. 23, 46 (1995).
38. JEAN BmKE ELsrrAiN, DEMOCRACY ON TRIuAL 53 (1995).

39. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 644 (1996) (Scalia, L,dissenting).
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alternative is a set of universal principles that define themselves. Such
principles would have to be unique and omnipresent in all cultures, at all
times, if there is to be no touch of the particular in their universality.
Neither these authors, nor the judicial practitioners, have suggested an
example of such principles. Accordingly, those who claim an identity for
political purposes of changing the status quo are criticized by these
universalists for being essentialists. However, their anti-essentialism does
not extend to particular forms of nationalism, including Americanism, or
particular forms of individualism that mask their commitment to the
dominant culture.
When Jean Elshtain argues that the object of the gay civil rights
movement has to be the withering away of a gay identity, she makes this
anti-essential claim for heterosexual life.40 Gay, lesbian, and bisexual
people, by seeking to liberate themselves from the universal, violate the
things that can not be part of the public discourse. This claim by Elshtain
describes the way that the "Woody Allen Blues" constructs gay, lesbian
and bisexual identity. Identity in this model is simply defined as opposition
to heterosexual life. However, the reason for that opposition is destroyed
by the extension of civil rights to gays and lesbians, and, therefore, the
reason for a separate and disruptive identity is eliminated.41 The rest of
identity is a product of private spaces. Part of the liberal ideology is a
reliance on the individual to make choices. However, it is not clear what
role identity plays in forming those choices. For Elshtain, Scalia, and
Schlesinger, the role is negative, creating choices that are defined from the
outside thereby limiting the individual. But how are individual choices
created without the influence of some community? It is clear how Justices
Scalia and O'Connor have a view of community43from their opinions in
44
Shaw v. Reno,42 City ofRichmond v. J.A. Croson, and Romer v. Evans.
For O'Connor, a community based upon race is suspect for redistricting
purposes, unless the community exists for other purposes.45 Black people
cannot gather to fight their oppression under this model. In this model,
black people and their communities are the problem, and the solution is a
replacement ofthose communities by white dominated districts. Black and
brown communities are essentialist, and white communities are simply a
40. See JEAN BETHKE ELSHTAIN, PUBLIC MAN, PRIVATE WOMAN: WOMEN IN SOCIAL AND

POLrTCALTHOUGHT 104 (1981).
41. See iad; Gary Lehring, Essentialismand the PoliticalArticulationof Identify, in PLAYING
WrrHFIRE: QUEER POTrICS, QUEERTlEORiES 173, 178-79 (Shane Phelan ed. 1997) (arguing that
by maling the personal political, gay liberationists have eliminated the category of personal and the
notion of privacy from political and cultural discourse).
42. 509 U.S. 630,642 (1993).
43. 488 U.S. 469,476 (1989); id at 735 (Scalia, J., concurring).
44. 517 U.S. 620,636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
45. See Shaw, 509 U.S. at 642.
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reflection of the universal.
Similarly, Justice Scalia's description of the "homosexual" community
as a politically powerful faction that is simply being chastened by the
majority for its imposition of "special" rights for "homosexuals," is a
description of a heterosexual community that reflects the universal. Justice
Scalia's claim is that the "homosexual" community is making essentialist
claims and that the universal power of the majority is, by definition, not
essentialist.
Ultimately, these attacks on the identity of those who are seeking
political change about what is fair and equal is an effort to prevent change.
Gays, lesbians, and bisexuals have no claim to politics if individual
treatment is fair. For the post-civil rights state, there can be no identity
politics that is fair because fairness has already happened at the individual
level.
In this model, all individual identity claims are "personal" and the
personal is not regulable by the law. This is, for gays, lesbians, and people
of color, an erasure of their stories and their political existence. It is the
"Woody Allen Blues" sung nationally by a "special" Amen
chorus-majority rules.
IV. AFTER IDENTITY PoITIcs
Skinner said the South Carolina chapter of the Sons of
Confederate Veterans hopes to attract its first black member,
Virginia, Texas, Tennessee, Maryland and
following
4
Florida.

Traditional ways of eliminating identity to create the common
citizenship, or the cosmopolitan person, do so by arguing that race or
ethnicity (including gender and sexual orientation) influences the results
in a small number of cases, and that these small number of cases should
not be the driving force behind the creation of legal rules.4" For Professor
Epstein, race cannot be an influence if both parties are of the same race,
and the legal rule should not be different if the parties are of different

46. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
47. Lyn Riddle, ConfederateMuseum;Blackswho FoughtforSouthHonoredTHEATILANTA
CONST., Feb. 28, 1997, at 2C.
48. See Richard A. Epstein, LegalEducationand the PoliticsofExclusion, 45 STAN. L. REV.
1607, 1624-25 (1993) ("For example, assume that there is a dispute between two (or more) people
of the same race or the same sex and that a rule must allocate competing legal rights between them.
Now identify the rules that allow these disputes to be resolved in a fashion acceptable to both sides.
Are they different from those which would be adopted in a dispute between black and white,
between male and female?").
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races.49 One response is that this approach to identity and racism produces
the use of tokens. The issue of identity is addressed by the inclusion of one
black person in the group or one black person who shares the view of
nonblack people. If Justice Thomas agrees with me, I am free of the
concern that my views may be racist, as many white academics and jurists
seem to believe. If the Sons of Confederate Veterans can find one black
person who will join them, then the claim that they are a racist organization
or that they stand for racism is eliminated. In this model, racism is just
racial essentialism. Racism has no subtlety, no volume or timbre.
This view of the law, race, and racism is at the heart of the "Woody
Allen Blues," because it is a truncated view of how race works in our
society. Race influences the growth and development of many laws. 0 This
should not surprise us but as long as we engage in the "Woody Allen
Blues," law cannot take cognizance of it. We are legally incapable of
seeing race or racism because we have structured a law that does not
permit their existence. Race can only be important in getting us to a rule
that eliminates its existence. Neither racism nor race exists in this model.
This is not a minor force in the law of race. Whenever the law
acknowledges the existence of racial identity, the constitutional
jurisprudence has to find a way to eliminate it. So, when a Reconstruction
Era Congress passes legislation to limit the ability of private parties to
discriminate against African Americans, the Supreme Court has to
conclude in the Civil Rights Cases that such legislation was beyond the
power of Congress and unnecessary because the "states" would protect the
interests of black people. Having states provide real protection would mean
that the law had to acknowledge that identity and we cannot do that inside
this model of race and racism.
Similarly, in striking down the ugly history of racial segregation in
public education, the Court had to do so in such a way that no real progress
occurred. After requiring some real change, the Court could not find the
jurisprudential will to make that progress permanent by either including
suburbs in the process or by continuing the process long enough to
effectuate change. Even when the Supreme Court does make a notable shift
in emphasis, as in the Court's significant decision in Griggsv. Duke Power
Co.,51 subsequent court decisions have eviscerated its power while others,
like St Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks," have eliminated the power of the

49. See iL
50. See Anders Walker, Legislating Virtue: How Segregationists Disguised Racial
DiscriminationasMoralReform Following Brown v. Board of Education, 47 DUKE L.L 399,405423 (1997) (showing the connection between changes in laws concerning legitimacy and marriage
in order to change the status of African Americans after the Brown decision).
51. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
52. 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
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Court's efforts to change the status quo in the other important line of Title
VII cases. It is hard to look at this history and see jurisprudential ability to
create permanent progress or a commitment to racial justice.
One answer provided by my (unfortunately temporary) colleague Gerry
Spann is that we should expect nothing less.53 Our system allows the
political majority to win and all this suggests is that when we win in the
courts, other political majorities will be created to thwart it. The political
majorities to limit the rights of immigrants-significantly Asian and
Latino-and to eliminate affirmative action through referendums in
California are just part of the political response to efforts to find racial
justice.
I will concede that law can play a role in making certain political moves
more difficult, but if racial groups or gays and lesbians are to protect
themselves from political oppression, they must form coalitions around
their oppression. These coalitions need not be exclusively identity-based,
but the political history of our country suggests that identity-based support
has been close to mandatory to make change possible.
There are several possible reasons for the necessity of identityconnected politics. It may be that if there is no commotion among those
who share an identity, it is impossible to convince a significant majority
among those not identified that wrongs exist. If black people are not
complaining about social justice, why should the vast majority of white
people conclude injustice is the rule rather than the exception? Why, for
example, is there almost no class-based politics in the United States? Is it
possible that the fact that there is very little class-based identity in our
society that allows those of us in the middle and upper classes to say
poverty must not be so bad? The American polity lacks a welfare rights
league or a labor party seeking class-connected concerns.
Indeed, the judicial or legislative response may create rules that allow
the development of identities that did not exist, and those identities may
push for the implementation of the rules. Something of that nature has
happened on college campuses with respect to Title IX. Women have used
that regulation to force universities to shift the position of women athletes
inside the university community, and some communities of women not
previously seen are present on our campuses. These political responses are
not identity-less aggregations.
I believe that politics is part of the solution, but I want to suggest that
the elimination of the "Woody Allen Blues" is also part of the solution. If
the ultimate legal question is how to get race out of the discourse, the only
tune that the courts can play is one that takes race and other identity out of
the discourse. It is the legal call for assimilation as the only appropriate

53. See generally GIRADEAU SPANN,

RACE AND THE COURTS (1997).
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rule that turns back efforts at racial justice. It is not bad Supreme Court
Justices or ineffective counsel that stop us from having a raciallyjust legal
system, but commitment to the death of identity and its corollary: ignoring
racism.
The other side of the notion of identity politics is also an issue of some
misappropriation. Politics that centers on the identity of participants in
legal question is frowned upon. When an oppressed social group organizes
politically to fight that oppression, we can not normally say that organizing
is wrong. So if that is not wrong, how can identity politics be wrong?
The answer given by its critics is that identity politics must ultimately
make identity the only issue. Organizing along racial, gender, or sexual
orientation community lines is wrong, because these community concerns
will trump the concerns of what we hold in common. "Identity politics" is
a bad phrase because it connotes narrow parochial factional concerns, and,
as we learned from the Federalist papers, the danger of such factions. We
have only to look at former Yugoslavia to see the dangers of identity
politics. Identity politics leads to war, strife and discord. Only through the
imposition of the common good can these horrors be avoided. This seems
to me to be an argument that proves too much. What kind of coalition that
does not draw on some community of oppression is likely to be effective
in the real world. Even a call for a class-based coalition for change would
be a product of a similar community. If race does not exist and therefore
racial communities are suspect, poverty too is problematic in any kind of
uniform way. As traditionally stated, this view of identity politics seems
like a defense of the status quo. If people can not organize their concerns
about the law around identities that they care about, who will be organized
to alter anything?
V. CONCLUSION

[T]he ideal of a national community, embracing all our races
and cultures, is one we cannot afford to abandon. To put that
ideal in constitutional language that does not ask the reader to
ignore history, we might say this: In the eyes of government,
America has only one class of citizens."
A number of years ago when I was helping my current employer search
for our third director of African-American Studies in approximately two
years, one of the candidates described her experience in interviewing for
similar jobs in all the best colleges and universities in the country. The
candidate described going to a number of places and meeting the one long-

54. Karst, supra note 9, at 368-69.
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time black professor. Often, this singular representative on campus arrived
at the brunch, tea, or reception dressed in a dashiki, or African headdress.
A number of these people mumbled something incoherent and left the
room, not able to make contact with a person of some similar racial
identity-or perhaps anyone. The candidate concluded that being on these
largely white campuses had destroyed the ability of many of these people
to maintain their identities.
The candidate for director of African-American Studies also remarked
that sometimes, there was a slightly different group of singular black
faculty. They were extremely conservative in their speech and dress, and
to all visible signs, completely assimilated into the culture of these white
campuses. These singular black figures, the candidate thought, were no
happier in trying to come to grips with their identity and that of their
campuses. As the only tenure track black faculty member at Duke
University School of Law, I did not have the courage to ask which category
I fell into.
Both of these responses by black faculty are inadequate. Both of these
responses are the personal equivalent of adopting the "Woody Allen
Blues." When the singular black professor hangs on to an identity and tries
to use it as a shield against the institutional denial of her existence by
wearing the outward indicia of race, she uses those affectations as real
politics. This response of using racial culture as a defense, without
effective political action, is personally supportive but socially unrewarding
because racial identity is not part of any recognizable solution. It is in
response to the call of the "Woody Allen Blues" that says to people of
color that they are professors who are well tanned. This response cannot
move society to where we want it to be. The opposite response of giving
in to the call of the 'Woody Allen Blues" is also inadequate. Assimilation
has costs too, in dignity and self worth. I believe that the only
transformative solution entails rejecting the "Woody Allen Blues" and
requiring new and hopefully better solutions to be produced. For law, this
means rejecting the seductive song of the 'Woody Allen Blues" and
substituting a rule of anti-subordination. This rule of anti-subordination by
necessity requires the law to respect the existence of the identities of its
racial and sexual minorities. This rule is not self-enforcing, but neither is
the 'Woody Allen Blues." Courts and legislatures play it every day, not
recognizing its force or importance.
A better 12-bar chorus consisting of a 3-line stanza, with the second
line repeating the first, would be one that says subordination is wrong and
must be eliminated. This chorus would call for the elimination of some
racial concerns, but only when they support the creation of subordination.
Race is evil only when it supports subordination. When we sing the wrong
blues, we do not understand why we are unhappy. Identity is not the
problem, and neither is "identity politics." Whether law is part of the
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solution ultimately depends on whether law produces an appropriate song.
VI. EPILOGUE
A final note-in one of Woody Allen's most recent films,
55
Deconstructing Harry, there is a significant black character.
Unfortunately, my guess about Woody Allen's inability to deal with race
is borne out by this character. She is all that racial stereotypes find in black
women from the very beginning of our country. She is a prostitute who is
not too bright, but very instinctual and supportive. Woody Allen lacks the
ability to find real black people with real lives and depth. The question for
the law is whether there is some better tune that can be sung instead of the
"Woody Allen Blues" that does not fall back into recreating oppressive
pasts. Unfortunately, for Woody Allen and his depiction of black people
in film, the answer is apparently no. I believe the law can and should do
better than Mr. Allen.

55. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol51/iss3/4

18

